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Religion in the Public Sphere: Challenges and 
Opportunities in Japan 
Hiroaki Kobayashi.∗
I. BACKGROUND 
The difficulties involved in church-state relations are certainly 
nothing new in a global context. However, as recent high profile 
issues in France and the United States demonstrate, there has been a 
renewed popular interest in the debate. A year-old French statute 
banning the wearing of Muslim headscarves and other religious 
paraphernalia in public schools has received massive worldwide 
attention.1 Almost concurrently, courts in the United States, 
including the Supreme Court, have considered both directly and 
indirectly whether the words “under God” in the pledge of 
allegiance violate the Establishment Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.2 These high profile cases, however, are just the tip of 
the iceberg.3 They represent only a small portion of the many less-
publicized or less-controversial cases dealing with church-state 
 ∗ Professor of Jurisprudence Nihon University, Visiting Professor of Jurisprudence, 
Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz, Germany. 
 1. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République Française 
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=MENX0400001L (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2005). For a detailed comparative analysis of recent issues affecting religious 
freedom in France and the United States, see T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laïcité: 
A Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419. 
 2. See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding, inter alia, that 
the words “under God” in the pledge of allegiance are unconstitutional). This initial decision 
was subsequently revised to eliminate the holding that the words “under God” are 
unconstitutional. See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (2002). Instead, the court simply 
ruled that a California statute requiring teachers to lead students in daily recitation of the 
pledge was unconstitutional. Id. In a four to four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court avoided 
the material issue by holding that the plaintiff, Michael Newdow, did not have standing to 
bring the action. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004); see also 
Gunn, supra note 1, at 423, 479–502. 
 3. In another example, the recent and tragic case of Terri Schiavo shows how political 
questions very often have religious dimensions. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, GOP, Democrats Look 
for Symbolism in Schiavo Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2005, at A12. 
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separation and religious freedom in many countries worldwide. All of 
these cases, however, necessarily involve a determination about the 
appropriate level of government involvement in the lives of citizens 
and their religious practices. The issues raised by these cases have 
significance in every free nation because they impact the right of 
individuals to live and worship as they choose. 
As in many countries, Japanese lawmakers and courts have 
confronted and continue to address the issue of separation of church 
and state in specific contexts relevant to the global discussion. In one 
notable Japanese case, the Supreme Court of Japan examined 
whether local governments could sponsor a traditional Shinto 
ceremony as a part of the groundbreaking ceremony of a 
government building.4 More recently, visits by important public 
figures, including the Prime Minister, to the controversial Yasukuni 
shrine, which honors those who died while serving in the Japanese 
military or Self Defense Forces, have sparked both domestic and 
international controversy over the separation of church and state in 
Japan.5
Legal analysis of such issues is often complicated by the close 
connection between Japanese history and culture and Japan’s 
centuries-old religious traditions.6 Judges and lawmakers often find 
themselves treading a tenuous line between governmental respect of 
cultural traditions and improper or unconstitutional interference 
with, or advancement of, religious practices. Significant differences of 
opinion remain about where the line should be drawn—differences 
that are not likely to subside in the foreseeable future. 
Although the discussion of the proper place for religion in the 
public sphere has great significance for religious freedom in every 
country, it is well known that the status of religion in the public 
sphere differs from nation to nation. The central focus of this paper 
is to analyze and identify precisely how “religion in the public 
 4. See Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, 31-4 MINSHŪ 533 (Sup. Ct., July 13, 1977), reprinted 
in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 
THROUGH 1990, at 478–91 (1996). 
 5. See, e.g., Norimitu Onishi, Ad Man-Turned-Priest Tackles His Hardest Sales Job, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2005, at A3 (reporting appointment of a new high priest at Yasukuni Shrine 
and discussing political pressure by China on Prime Minister Koizumi to stop his visits to the 
shrine). 
 6. See, e.g., Japan v. Nakaya, 42-5 MINSHŪ 277 (Sup. Ct., June 1, 1988), reprinted in 
BEER & ITOH, supra note 4, at 492; Kakunaga, 31-4 MINSHŪ 533, reprinted in BEER & 
ITOH, supra note 4, at 478. 
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sphere” operates in modern Japan. To help the reader attain a 
workable understanding of the contemporary relationship between 
church and state in Japan, this paper introduces some foundational 
concerns in the Japanese church-state dynamic. Specifically, Part II 
surveys the history and character of church-state relations in Japan. 
Parts III, IV, and V discuss freedom of religion in Japan in the 
various contexts of the Japanese Constitution and its ramifications 
for religion in public fora, in judicial decisions, and in the treatment 
of religious education in public schools. Part VI summarizes the 
place of religion in the public sphere in modern Japan, and Part VII 
concludes that the state can and should retain a neutral disposition 
with regard to religion, which would allow it to avoid being either 
nonreligious or antireligious. This Article will ultimately conclude 
that government neutrality vis-à-vis religion should not be construed 
to require the surgical removal of the positive influences of religious 
history and traditional religious values that properly inform a 
country’s constitutional structure. 
II. THE HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF CHURCH-STATE  
RELATIONS IN JAPAN 
A. The Interrelation of Religion, Culture, and Religious Relativism 
The church-state debate in Japan is complicated because 
Japanese culture and religion are not easily separated. The religious 
life of the Japanese people can be seen in the interplay between 
Shinto and Buddhism. Most Japanese worship at Shinto shrines at 
the beginning of the year and participate in Buddhist memorial 
services for their ancestors during the summer. They will generally 
celebrate their birth by Shinto ritual, hold their wedding ceremony 
according to Shinto or Christian tradition,7 and be buried in a 
Buddhist ceremony.8
 7. Thirty-five percent of marriages in the Tokyo (Kanto) area, and twenty-four percent 
of marriages in the Kyoto-Osaka (Kansai) area are performed by Christian ceremony. 
 8. See Tokihisa Sumimoto, Religious Freedom Problems in Japan: Background and 
Current Prospects, 5 INT’L J. PEACE STUD., Autumn/Winter (2000), http://www.gmu.edu/ 
academic/ijps/vol5_2/sumimoto.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2005); Scott M. Lenhart, Note, 
Hammering Down Nails, 29 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 491, 512–13 (2001). Many Japanese 
also participate in Shinto memorial services. See Nakaya, 42-5 MINSHŪ 277, reprinted in BEER 
& ITOH, supra note 4, at 492–516 (1996) (describing litigation brought by the wife of a 
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Both historically and currently, it is uncommon for a Japanese 
person to believe in only one religion or one god and devote his or 
her whole life to that one religion or god. The Japanese “religious 
population” is often calculated at more than 220 million, despite the 
fact that the entire population of Japan is only 130 million.9 This 
implies what is generally known to be true: the typical Japanese 
belongs to more than one religious organization.10 Today’s modern 
Japanese typically belongs to a Buddhist sect because of family 
tradition11 and is affiliated with the local Shinto shrine because he is a 
member of the community.12
One of the reasons that Christianity and other “new religions” 
(such as Aum Shinrikyo, Tenrikyo, Omotokyo, and Soka Gakkai)13 
have been alienated from Japanese society lies in the fact that for 
many Japanese, the exclusivity requirements of these religions are at 
odds with their traditional pluralistic religiosity.14
Japanese Self-Defense Force member who opposed his post-mortem enshrinement because of 
her Christian faith). 
 9. See Kenichi Asano, Japan’s Imperial-Era Society: From the Anti-AUM Movement to 
the Elimination of all Heterodoxies, http://www.cesnur.org/testi/aum_018.htm (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2005). 
 10. See id. 
 11. See, e.g., Sumimoto, supra note 8. 
During the Tokugawa period (1600-1868), Japanese Buddhism was formally 
incorporated into the feudal administrative institution . . . [and] required every 
household to be affiliated with a particular Buddhist temple. . . . Although the law 
establishing this system was rescinded in 1871, to this day many families still feel a 
special obligation to the temple with which their ancestors were registered . . . . 
Id. 
 12. See 2 RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD: A COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BELIEFS 
AND PRACTICES 718 (J. Gordon Melton & Martin Baumann eds., 2002) [hereinafter 2 
RELIGIONS]. 
 13. “New religion” refers loosely to those religions that have arisen in Japan during the 
last century.  
 14. Obviously, there are other reasons as well. For example, the Tokugawa Shogunate 
began to fear the increased power of foreign missionaries. For a fictional account of 
persecutions imposed on Japanese Christians in the 1600s, see SHUSAKU ENDO, CHINMOKU 
[SILENCE] (1966). Presently in Japan, it is estimated that ten to twenty percent of the total 
population are now associated with “new religions,” whereas Japanese Christians constitute less 
than one percent of the population. For a general discussion of the historical interaction 
between Shinto and Buddhism, see Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, 31-4 MINSHŪ 533 (Sup. Ct., July 
13, 1977) (Fujibayashi, C.J., dissenting), reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 4, at 488. 
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B. The Emperor in Shinto and Buddhism 
In addition to the pluralistic religiosity of Japanese history and 
culture, the emperor, as the traditional personification of 
government, has historically had a prominent connection to religious 
sites, ceremonies, and customs. For example, the Emperor is 
traditionally seen as the chief priest of Shinto, and the prominent Ise 
Shrine—often considered the most important Shinto shrine—is 
closely related to the imperial family.15
Similarly, Buddhism has long often been affiliated with the 
Imperial family. When Buddhism was introduced into Japan from 
the Korean peninsula in AD 538, it received considerable political 
support from Prince Shotoku (574-622).16 Two hundred years later, 
the Todaiji Temple was built in Nara, then the resident city of the 
emperor. The building of this important temple in the city of the 
emperor implied that Buddhism was integrated with his political 
authority.17 Since then, Buddhism has been advanced as the religion 
that advocates the security and protection of the state,18 and 
consequently, it has flourished under state and imperial auspices.19
C. Freedom of Religion in the Meiji Period and the Unique  
Position of Shinto 
While Buddhism burgeoned for much of Japan’s history, from 
the Meiji Restoration period (1866-1869) until the end of World 
War II, “State Shinto” was the national religion under Japan’s 
constitutional monarchy.20 During this period, the government 
 15. See JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA, RELIGION IN JAPANESE HISTORY 168 (1990). Moreover, 
the priests of the prominent Shinto shrines keep actual ties of wedlock with the Imperial 
Household. See generally id. at 30–38. 
 16. See 4 RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD: A COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BELIEFS 
AND PRACTICES 1165 (J. Gordon Melton & Martin Baumann eds., 2002) [hereinafter 4 
RELIGIONS]. Prince Shotoku even built the Horyuji Temple, which boasts some of the world’s 
oldest wooden structures and is still an important Buddhist site. See generally Horyuji: A Brief 
History, http://www.horyuji.or.jp/horyuji_e.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2005). 
 17. See KITAGAWA, supra note 15, at 35. 
 18. See 2 RELIGIONS, supra note 12, at 718. 
 19. See supra note 11. Like the priests of prominent Shinto shrines, the priests of the 
head temples of the main Buddhist denominations continue to keep ties of wedlock with the 
Imperial Household. See generally KITAGAWA, supra note 15, at 30–38. 
 20. See Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, 31 MINSHŪ 4, 533 (Sup. Ct. July 13,1977) (Yoshida, J., 
dissenting), reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 4, at 483–85; 2 RELIGIONS, supra note 12, 
at 718. 
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ordered the separation of Shinto from Buddhism,21 enacted the 
Religious Organization Law—which largely brought the religious 
activities of the Japanese people under state control—and generally 
regulated non-Shinto religious activity.22 The State suppressed and 
persecuted Christianity and other “new religions” because of their 
perceived incompatibility with the traditional imperial system.23 The 
State further coerced people to submit to State Shinto as the national 
religion and rejected religions that advocated worldwide 
universalism.24 Finally, the State guaranteed religious freedom only 
“within limits not antagonistic to Japanese citizens’ duties as subjects 
of the emperor”—a caveat based on the assumption that the 
religious authority of the emperor would be absolute. 
Although the “duties as subjects” referred to secular duties such 
as military service, tax payment, and obedience to established law, it 
did not refer to worship at a Shinto shrine.25 By fusing religious 
principles with secular civic duties through the previously mentioned 
limitations on non-Shinto religions and the worship of the emperor 
as a kami,26 the State made Shinto both a religious and secular 
phenomenon. In many ways, however, the State treated Shinto as a 
“non-religion.”27 For example, while all non-Shinto religions were 
under the jurisdiction of the Education Ministry, Shinto was under 
the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry.28 Furthermore, the State 
prohibited Shintoists from recruiting new members or practicing 
Shinto funeral rites and limited  the subsidy for shrines to ten 
percent of legitimate expenses. Thus, although it is commonly 
believed that the national government protected Shinto, the reality 
for Shinto believers was very different. The fact is, the established 
 21. This separation is commonly called the Haibutsu-Kishaku. 
 22. See KITAGAWA, supra note 15, at 278–79. 
 23. During World War II, state control over religions intensified, and the state restricted 
the activities of Christian churches that were regarded as conflicting with the national polity 
(kokutai). This is because Christianity and many new religions were largely seen as threats to 
those who wanted to maintain the status quo. 
 24. See KITAGAWA, supra note 15, at 200–03. 
 25. AKIRA MOMOCHI, KENPO TO SEIKYOBUNRI [THE CONSTITUTION AND 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE] 31 (1991); Takeshi Hirano, Meijikenpokano 
Seikyokankei [State-Church-Relations under the Meiji-Constitution], 52 KOHOKENKYU 64 
(1990).  
 26. The kami are the Shinto deities. The word “kami” is generally translated “god” or 
“gods.” However, the kami bear little resemblance to the gods of monotheistic religions. 
 27. MOMOCHI, supra note 25, at 30. 
 28. See KITAGAWA, supra note 15, at 212. 
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State Shinto was more concerned with civic duty than religious 
ritual,29 and even legitimate Shinto religious rituals were regulated by 
the State. 
It is thus inaccurate to say that State Shinto has ever been the 
established religion of Japan in the same way that Christianity was 
the established religion of much of Europe or that Islam is the 
established religion of some Middle East countries. As the regulation 
of State Shinto leading up to and during World War II 
demonstrates, religion in Japan has been subjected to State power, 
yet religion has not exercised power over the State. 
Despite a history of government regulation of religion, the 
current problem of church-state relations in Japan involves divining 
how best to liberate the religious practice of individuals and their 
organizations from excessive or unnecessary intervention by the 
national government. More specifically, the challenge is how to make 
the State respect religious freedom given the past church-state 
dynamic. 
III. FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 
Two conflicting forces have shaped the government’s treatment 
of religion during the postwar period. First, the new constitution 
imposed by the Allied Occupation Forces not only disestablished 
State Shinto (perhaps as an act of repentance for the religious policy 
of the Meiji era), but its language seemingly excluded religion from 
the public arena entirely and set the groundwork for a rigid 
separation of church and state.30 Second, the Religious Corporation 
Law (1951) offered religions protection and generous treatment 
under the tax system. 
The Religious Corporation Law, which was implemented as part 
of the postwar revised constitution, sought the protection of religion 
generally and was a form of governmental repentance for the 
unjustified suppression of religious organizations in prewar times. 
The basic assumption of the law is that registered religious 
organizations contribute to the public good; therefore, economic 
activities and public utilities are permitted to support religious 
 29. For an in depth discussion of State Shinto during the Meiji era, see KITAGAWA, 
supra note 15, at 177–261; see also 4 RELIGIONS, supra note 16, at 1167–68. 
 30. See generally KENPŌ [Constitution] art. 89 (Japan). 
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activity. To this end, the law established 180,000 independent 
religious “corporations.” 
The Religious Corporation Law leveled the playing field for all 
religions, which means that Buddhism and Shinto now have a legal 
status equal to that of minority religions, including Christianity. In 
this respect, the legal enfranchisement and protection of religious 
minorities was established. Moreover, under the Religious 
Corporation Law, the range of permitted activities for religious 
organizations is very broad, with few formal rules regulating religion. 
This Part will explain the relevant legal provisions regarding 
religion under the Japanese Constitution and will demonstrate that 
these constitutional provisions have been misapplied, thereby shifting 
the focus from the general protection of religious freedom to efforts 
to enforce a rigid separation of religion and state. This Part suggests 
ways to properly identify and interpret the separation doctrine as a 
means of achieving religious freedom and encourages a broader sense 
of religious neutrality that is more generous and tolerant to the free 
exercise of religious tenets. 
A. “Freedom of Religion” Articles in the Japanese Constitution 
To fully examine the constitutional basis for religious freedom in 
Japan, it is necessary to briefly note the American jurisprudential 
influence on Japanese law following World War II. After World War 
II, the occupation forces, consisting mainly of U.S. personnel, 
drafted a new Japanese Constitution that superseded the Meiji 
Constitution and is still in effect today. The Japanese Government 
submitted it to the Diet, which adopted it subject to a degree of 
oversight, revision, and censorship by the occupation forces.31
Accordingly, the articles relating to the freedom of religion are 
based in large part on a western, and more specifically an American, 
way of thinking about religious jurisprudence and culture.32 
Naturally, both the academic community and the courts followed the 
judicial precedents established in the United States on the subject of 
church-state relations.33 With this historical understanding, it is now 
 31. See HIROAKI KOBAYASHI, DER PAZIFISMUS IN JAPAN [THE PACIFISM IN JAPAN] 18 
(1998). 
 32. This development may be demonstrative of the spiritual and legal control that can 
be exercised by occupation forces over an occupied nation in a state of lethargy after its defeat.  
 33. See, e.g., NOBUHIKO TAKIZAWA, KOKKA TO SHUKYO NO BUNRI [SEPARATION OF 
STATE AND RELIGION] (1985); Yasuhiro Okudaira, Kenpososho no Kido to Riron [Track and 
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possible to examine the constitutional and judicial aspects of 
religious freedom in Japan. 
The constitutional provisions dealing with religion are Articles 
20 and 89: 
Article 20:  
(1) Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious 
organization shall receive any privileges from the state, nor 
exercise any political authority. 
(2) No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious 
acts, celebration, rite or practice. 
(3) The state and its organization shall refrain from religious 
education or any other religious activity.34
Article 89: 
No public money or other property shall be expended or 
appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any 
religious institution or association, or for any charitable, 
educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of 
public authority.35
Pursuant to these provisions, the State is obliged to take a 
neutral and nonunifying attitude toward all religions and 
denominations. Moreover, regardless of whether it is perceived as an 
“established” or a “new religion,” the permitted range of religious 
activities under the current constitution is considerably broad, and 
there are few rules regulating religion.36 Consequently, the need for 
a special body of law to protect religious minorities is rarely, if ever, 
seriously discussed within academic circles.37
Theory of Lawsuits Concerning the Constitution], Hogaku Seminar, 1983; Hideo Tsuchiya, 
Amerika Gashukoku ni okeru Seikyobunri [Separation of Church and State in the United States: 
Analysis of Characteristics of the Federal Supreme Court], 98 KOKKAGAKUZASHI. Nos. 11 & 12 
(1985). 
 34. KENPŌ [Constitution]  art. 20 (Japan). 
 35. Id. art. 89. 
 36. See Religious Corporation Law (1951). 
 37. One of the few contexts in which religious minorities are ever discussed in Japanese 
academia involves a problem called “deprogramming,” which involves an attack by members of 
a religious minority (the Church of Christ in Japan associated with leftist lawyers) against 
members of a different religious minority (Unification Church members). See U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, JAPAN (1999) 
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Nevertheless, the constitutional command that the state maintain 
a neutral and nonunifying attitude towards all religions was not 
designed to mandate the state’s indifference toward, withdrawal 
from, or antagonism against religion. Consequently, I believe that 
the rigid separation of church and state, as currently interpreted, 
results in a complete removal of religion from national life and 
fosters a suppression of religious freedom.38 Nonetheless, the theory 
of a rigid separation of church and state has been the mainstream 
principle underlying church-state relations in postwar Japan.39
B. Freedom of Religion and the Separation of Church and State 
In seeking a separation of church and state, it is important to 
remember that enforcing such a separation should be only a means 
to the end of protecting religious freedom.40
The concept of freedom of religion originated in the 
Reformation of the early sixteenth century. Together with freedom 
of conscience, it is one of the oldest and most fundamental of human 
rights.41 Freedom of religion applies to both individuals and 
organizations. For individuals, freedom of religion refers, internally, 
to the freedom to have the religious faith of one’s own choice or to 
have none at all. Externally, it refers to the freedom to conduct 
deeds, rituals, or proselytizing activities based on that religious faith. 
For an organization, freedom of religion refers to the freedom to 
carry out its religious activities (including political activities) in a 
(describing deprogramming as kidnapping and false confinement of an adult). However, this is 
an issue involving the interaction of religious minorities in Japan, rather than the constitutional 
protections of religious minorities.  
 38. For example, since the end of World War II there have been numerous calls to 
prohibit the Emperor or Prime Minister from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, all based on a strict 
interpretation of the separation of church and state. This not only infringes upon the individual 
religious freedom of these officers but also ignores the fact that many Japanese support visiting 
this shrine as a matter of expressing the nation’s continued appreciation for the war dead. See 
infra notes 97 to 101 and accompanying text. 
 39. The effects of this principle can be seen in two fields; one is in the judicial decisions 
concerning the separation of church and state, and the other is the state policies governing 
religious education. 
 40. See Akira Momochi (1991), op. cit. p. 68 [hereinafter Momochi (1991)]. 
 41. See HIROAKI KOBAYASHI, RYOSHIN NO JIYU TO KOKKA [THE FREEDOM OF 
CONSCIENCE AND THE STATE] 1–42 (Seiko-Priplan 1995); see also Kevin J. Worthen, 
Introduction, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1093, 1094 n.6. 
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broad sense.42 Ensuring some separation between the state and 
established religion is necessary as a means to achieving true religious 
freedom.43 In Japan, however, the separation of church and state has 
often been seen not as a means of securing religious freedom but as 
an end in itself.44
To ensure that freedom of religion is, in fact, the constitutional 
goal, it is necessary to: 
1. Set aside the issue of separation of church and state for the 
time being;45
 42. The assertion in the text that religious organizations should be free to carry out 
political activities is not in conflict with the constitutional command that “[n]o religious 
organization shall . . . exercise any political authority.” KENPŌ [Constitution] art. 20(3) 
(Japan). The constitutional command is concerned with preventing religious groups from 
exercising actual political authority (as a political party for example), rather than with 
promulgating their position on political issues or even in lobbying. It would be odd for the 
Japanese Constitution to prohibit any political activity by religious groups when the American 
Constitution—which is the primary foundation, if not the sole basis, of the Japanese 
Constitution—allows, and sometimes under the Free Speech Clause guarantees, religious 
organizations the ability to participate in lobbying and other political activities. See 
Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) (“More than once have we rejected the 
position that the Establishment Clause even justifies, much less requires, a refusal to extend 
free speech rights to religious speakers who participate in broad-reaching government 
programs neutral in design.”).
 43. See Momochi (1991), supra note 40, at 68. 
 44. This may be because the Japanese Constitution was given as a “gift” by the U.S. 
occupation forces, who somewhat clumsily meshed American concepts of Free Exercise and 
Establishment into one article. See KENPŌ [Constitution] art. 20(1) (Japan). 
 45. See Hiroaki Kobayashi, Nishidoitsu ni okeru Seikyobunri [Separation of Church and 
State in West Germany], in 22 KENPOKENKYU [The Journal of Constitutional Law] 19 
(1990). This assertion is not so radical in other countries. For example, there are only two 
German language monographs with a title that includes the phrase “Trennung von Staat und 
Kirche” (Separation of Church and State). They are: Z. GIACOMETTI, QUELLEN ZU 
GESCHICHTE DER TRENNUNG VON STAAT UND KIRCHE, TUEBINGEN [SOURCES OF THE 
HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, TUEBINGEN] (1926); and E. 
FISCHER, TRENNUNG VON STAAT UND KIRCHE: RELIGIONSFREIHEIT IN DER 
BUNDESREPUBLIK [SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE 
GERMAN REPUBLIC] (1964). It is true that there are constitutional scholars who distinguish 
“the separation of church and state in a broad sense” and “the separation of church and state 
in a narrow sense.” The former is interpreted as the “prohibition of mutual intervention 
between politics and religion,” and is placed as a fundamental principle of a modern state (and 
is sometimes even regarded as absolute and universal in present era). It stands up alright as a 
theory. However, I believe that it is potentially dangerous to treat “mutual intervention 
between politics and religion” as a constitutionally mandated “separation of church and state” 
issue, whether in a “broad sense” or a “narrow sense,” because such treatment confuses the 
relationship between the purpose (religious freedom) and the method (separation of church 
and state). Originally, even under the Japanese Constitution, “the separation of church and 
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2. Recognize “neutrality of the state toward religions, 
religious sects and philosophies of life” (Weltanschauungen); 
3. Clarify the differences and commonalties between the tasks 
of the state and those of religious organizations; 
4. Respect the mutual independence of the state and 
religious organizations; and then 
5. Examine, where necessary, the possibility of separating or 
supplementing one another. 
In the current social environment in Japan, with its various forms 
of religious faith and philosophies of life, it is virtually impossible for 
the state to take any attitude other than neutrality towards religion, 
expressed in the principled attitude of generosity.46 The 
constitutional mandate for the state to take a neutral attitude toward 
religions and philosophies of life is, at its root, nothing but a 
mandate to take a generous or tolerant attitude toward them.47 
Saying that government should be tolerant towards religions is 
simply a recognition that denying benefits or otherwise being 
ungenerous or intolerant to religions or religious believers would 
infringe on the latter’s right to freely exercise their religion. It is 
wrong to assume that the requirement of neutrality gives a secular 
state a mandate to take an intolerant attitude toward religious 
believers. 
state” is not a directly defined “source of the law;” rather it is a scholarly concept for easy 
comprehension. AKIRA MOMOCHI. SEIKYOBUNRI TOWA NANIKA - SOTEN NO KAIMEI [WHAT 
IS SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE? CLARIFICATION OF ISSUES] 8 (1997); Hiroaki 
Kobayashi, Glaubensfreiheit und Aufstellen von Kreuzen im Gerichtssaal im Lichte der 
Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Religious Freedom and the Display of Crosses in 
Courtrooms in Light of the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court], 34 SEYKEIKENKYU 529 
(1998) (Japanese); Hiroaki Kobayashi, Glaubensfreiheit und Schulgebet im Lichte der 
Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Religious Freedom and School Prayer in Light of the 
Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court], 34 SEYKEIKENKYU 229 (1998) (Japanese). 
 46. See R. Herzog Komm. zu art. 4 GG. in Maunz/Durig/Herzog/Scholz. 
Grundgesetz. 3. Aufl.1989. Rdnr. 19f. 
 47. See Zippelius. Kom. zu art. 4 CG. in Bonner Komm. (2. Bearb.) Rdnr. 2ff. 5. 
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IV. CRITERIA FOR THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
A. The Separation of Church and State as a Judicial Ideal 
In Japan there is a consensus that the separation of church and 
state is a foundation to guarantee the freedom of religion.48 There 
are, however, differences of opinion as to whether the separation of 
church and state is the means of ensuring freedom of religion, or 
whether the two concepts are inseparably united, concomitant terms. 
The view that the separation of church and state is the essential 
prerequisite for religious freedom does not, however, enjoy universal 
approval. Nevertheless, both in theory and in Japanese judicial 
decisions, there are those who support it.49 In fact, many judicial 
decisions endorse a view of strict separation premised on the belief 
that such separation is required to protect religious freedom. For 
example, in perhaps the most important Supreme Court decision on 
the issue, Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, announced in 1977, the dissent 
idealized the separation of church and state. It noted that “a correct 
interpretation of the principle of separation of religion and State 
embodied in [the Japanese Constitution] would require absolute 
separation, that is, that religion and the State should be mutually 
independent with no connecting ties.”50 Twenty years later, in a case 
brought against the governor and administrators of Ehime 
Prefecture, Anzai v. Shiraishi, the majority of the Court echoed that 
sentiment in concluding that “the [c]onstitution should be 
interpreted as striving for a secular and religiously neutral state by 
regarding the total separation of state and religion as its ideal.”51 In 
 48. See Momochi (1991), supra note 40, at 9. 
 49. Id. at 76. 
 50. 31-4 MINSHŪ 533 (Sup. Ct., July 13, 1977) (Yoshida, J., dissenting), reprinted in 
BEER & ITOH, supra note 4, at 484. 
 51. 51-4 MINSHŪ 1673 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 2, 1997) (an English translation is available at 
http://courtdomino.courts.go.jp/promjudg.nsf/ffc82a0a5fb61e504925648f00352937/647e
c01fcfd520f74925680e001e611f?OpenDocument (last visited May 18, 2004)). In the next 
paragraph, though, the court states a more nuanced approach to the separation of state and 
religion: 
[T]he state unavoidably connects with religion when the state regulates social life or 
implements various policies to promote or subsidize education, social welfare, or 
culture. Thus, an actual system of government that attempts a total separation 
would inevitably lead to unreasonable situations in society. Thus, it follows that 
there are inevitable and natural limits to the separation of state and religion. 
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both cases, the Court or the dissent made this assertion without 
providing any grounds to support it. Their boldness in making such 
an assertion without any significant support is astonishing. It is an 
assertion that goes beyond the stance adopted in the United States, 
the mother country of the occupation forces that imposed upon 
Japan the constitution and its religious freedom provisions.52
B. Criteria for the Separation of Church and State  
in Judicial Decisions 
1. Separation of church and state in United States Supreme Court 
decisions 
In recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the majority of the 
Court has identified several principles that courts must consider 
when addressing whether a law violates the Establishment Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution. For example, the government cannot endorse 
any religion in a general or specific manner that a reasonable 
observer would interpret as preferential or favoring a particular 
religion.53 Furthermore, the government cannot engage in any 
activity that has a primarily religious purpose, even if it is facially 
neutral,54 and the government cannot directly or indirectly provide 
aid to religion.55 Because these principles are relatively broad and 
have resulted in some confusion and inconsistency throughout the 
relevant case law, the U.S. Supreme Court has gradually developed 
more specific rules, but even these have generated controversy and 
have been criticized for being overly vague.56
Id.  
 52. For a careful analysis of the Kakunaga decision in an American law review, see 
David M. Beatty, The Forms and Limits of Constitutional Interpretation, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 
79, 112–16 (2001).
 53. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that a nativity 
scene prominently displayed in a court house constituted an impermissible government 
endorsement of religion). 
 54. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
 55. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (holding that aid given to Catholic 
schools under a federal program subject to express conditions that the aid be used for secular 
purposes and that monitoring occur to ensure compliance did not violate the Establishment 
clause). The implication of Mitchell is that had the federal funds gone to religious education, 
the aid would have violated the Establishment Clause. Id. 
 56. The Court has at times attempted to follow its own three part “Lemon test,” 
requiring that to be constitutional: (1) a government action must have a secular legislative 
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Despite this confusion, it is clear that if the law in question 
violates one of the three broad principles outlined above, it is 
regarded as a law to establish a state religion and is consequently 
unconstitutional.57 Nevertheless, the reality in America is that various 
religious practices are embedded in the life of the people in America 
as a whole;58 thus, even today, church and state in America are far 
from being separated completely. 
purpose; (2) the action’s principal purpose or primary effect must be one that does not advance 
or inhibit religion; and (3) the action must not engender an excessive government 
entanglement with religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). However, the 
Court has concluded that the test is too abstract and vague to be effective in fact specific 
situations and has had to generate ad hoc rules according to the cases that have come before it. 
Consequently, the Lemon test has become a rule generation device more than a specific test to 
be precisely applied in any given situation. See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 724–25 (2001). 
 57. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1992). 
 58. For example, the oath of office administered to every U.S. President is 
constitutionally prescribed, in accordance with Article II, Section I of the U.S. Constitution: “I 
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United 
States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.” While the required text has no reference to religion, the first U.S. president, 
George Washington, recited the oath adding extemporaneously the words “so help me God.” 
Since then, it has become tradition to likewise add the reference to God. See Wolfe Blitzer 
Reports: Bush Inauguration Ceremony About to Begin (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 20, 
2005) (transcript available at 2005 WLNR 809324); see also Delia M. Rios, President’s Faith 
Viewed as Zealotry: Most Presidents Have Spoken of Religion, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, 
LA), Nov. 23, 2004, available at http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/washington/index.ssf?/ 
base/news-0/110119845762010.xml. 
The annual observance of Thanksgiving is also a cherished American tradition that was 
memorialized by the first U.S. president, George Washington. In 1789, he issued the first 
Presidential Thanksgiving proclamation declaring a day of “thanksgiving and prayer.” Also, in 
his first inaugural address, President Washington declared, “No people can be bound to 
acknowledge and adore the Invisible Hand which conducts the affairs of men more than those 
of the United States.” Subsequently, Congress passed a joint resolution requesting the 
President establish “a day of public Thanksgiving and Prayer, to be observed by acknowledging 
with grateful hearts the many and signal Favors of Almighty God.” As referenced by President 
George H.W. Bush, in President Washington’s first such proclamation, he wrote, “It is the 
Duty of all Nations to acknowledge the Providence of Almighty God, to obey his Will, to be 
grateful for his Benefits, and humbly to implore His Protection and Favor.” See Proclamation 
No. 6073, 54 Fed. Reg. 48,225 (Nov. 17, 1989). The current U.S. president proclaimed the 
days around September 11 as “National Days of Prayer and Remembrance.” See Proclamation 
No. 7811, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,715 (Sept. 10, 2004). Congress has similarly asked the President 
to declare a National Day of Prayer on the “first Thursday in May as a National Day of Prayer 
on which the people of the United States may turn to God in prayer and meditation at 
churches, in groups, and as individuals.” See 36 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
In fact, many of the officially recognized U.S. holidays reference or recognize religiously 
oriented holidays such as Christmas, Thanksgiving, Memorial Day, etc. See 5 U.S.C. § 6103 
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2. The separation of religion and states in Japanese judicial decisions—
from Kakunaga to Anzai 
The first lawsuit in Japan in which an all-out polemic was 
conducted over the issue of the constitutional separation of church 
and state, Kakunaga, concerned a Shinto ceremony purifying a 
building site in Tsu City. The appellate court judge applied the 
theory of rigid separation, holding the involvement of the local 
government in a Shinto ceremony unconstitutional.59
The Supreme Court, however, adopted a more permissive theory 
of limited separation based on a “purpose-effects test,” which looks 
at whether the government purpose behind the challenged conduct 
was to advance religion or whether it had that effect.60 The majority 
concluded that even if there were religious implications to the 
ceremony, because the purpose of the groundbreaking at the 
building site was “chiefly secular[,] [i]t will not have the effect of 
promoting or encouraging Shinto or of oppressing or interfering 
with other religions.”61 Therefore, the Court held, it was permissible 
for the city to make a courtesy donation to the Shinto priest.62 The 
Supreme Court has since reaffirmed this stance in a case concerning a 
joint memorial service for the members of the Self Defense Forces 
who died on duty.63 With these decisions, it appeared that the theory 
of limited separation had become an established precedent under 
Japanese law. 
(2000). Also, many of the patriotic and national hymns and anthems of the United States 
include references to deity; consider “God Bless America” and “The Star Spangled Banner.” 
Since 1923, U.S. presidents also light a “National Christmas Tree” outside the White House 
every year near Christmas (December 25) to celebrate the “holiday spirit.” See THE WHITE 
HOUSE, PAGEANT OF PEACE: THE NATIONAL TREE, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
president/holiday/tree/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2005). While portrayed as an inclusive cultural 
event, this act clearly has religious undertones relating to the Christian commemoration of 
Christmas.  
 59. Decision by the High Court at Nagoya, 22 Collection of Precedents No. 5, 680 
(High Ct., May 14, 1971).  
 60. Anzai v. Shiraishi, 51-4 MINSHŪ 1673 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 2, 1997). 
 61. Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, 31-4 MINSHŪ 533 (Sup. Ct., July 13, 1977), reprinted in 
BEER & ITOH, supra note 4 at 483. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Japan v. Nakaya, 42 MINSHŪ 5, at 277 (1988), reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra 
note 4, at 492–516 (describing litigation brought by the wife of a Japanese Self-Defense Force 
member who opposed his post-mortem enshrinement/deification because of her Christian 
faith). 
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After Kakunaga, the lower courts tended to adopt the theory of 
limited separation until the 1980s. Around this time, lower Japanese 
courts rendered an increasing number of judgments reflecting 
adherence to the theory of rigid separation. For example, local and 
appellate cases dealing with issues such as joint memorial services for 
the members of the Self Defense Forces who died on duty,64 a 
ceremony celebrating the completion of a monument to the loyal 
dead,65 a ceremony to comfort the spirits of the dead,66 and the 
donation of public money for a Shinto ceremony67 all demonstrated 
the prevailing philosophies of the lower courts: in each case, based 
on theory of rigid separation, the courts found the practices 
unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court reviewed this last case, Anzai v. Shiraishi, 
and ostensibly applied the more flexible “purpose-effects test” to a 
situation involving donations to Shinto shrines by government 
officials of the Ehime Prefecture.68 However, the Court applied this 
test rigidly and found the donations unconstitutional.69
As one of the most recent major decisions on the issue of 
church-state separation, the Anzai decision merits further 
explication. From 1981 to 1986, the Governor of Ehime Prefecture 
instructed subordinates to make contributions from public money to 
both the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo and the Gokoku Shrine in 
Ehime.70 Each donation was rather small—¥5,000 (approximately 
$50) to the Yasukuni Shrine and ¥10,000 to the Gokoku Shrine—
and was to be used for ceremonies held to comfort the sprits of 
Japanese soldiers who have died in war and their family members.71
 64. See Decision by the High Court at Hiroshima, 1046 HANREI JIHŌ 3 (Dist. Ct., June 
1, 1982); Decision by the District Court at Yamaguchi, 921 HANREI JIHŌ 44 (Dist. Ct. 1979). 
 65. See Decision by the District Court at Osaka, 33 Collection of Precedents No. 3, 564 
(Dist. Ct., Mar. 24, 1982). 
 66. See Decision by the District Court at Osaka, 34 Collection of Precedents No.3, 358 
(Dist. Ct., Mar. 1, 1983). 
 67. See Decision by the District Court at Matsuyama, 40 Collection of Precedents No. 
3, 188 (Dist. Ct., Mar. 17, 1989). 
 68. Anzai v. Shiraishi, 51-4 MINSHŪ 1673 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 2, 1997). 
 69. See Akira Momochi (1997). op. cit., p. 211; Akira Momochi, Ehime Tamagushiryo 
Sosho Saikosai Hanketsu o megutte [On the Decision by the Supreme Court on the Lawsuit over 
Tamagushiryo at Ehime], in 63-4 NIHON HOGAKU 47. 
 70. Anzai, 51-4 MINSHŪ 1673. 
 71. Id. The contributions to both the Yasukuni and Gokoku shrines were made nine 
times, for an aggregate total of ¥45,000 (approximately $450) to Yasukuni and ¥90,000 
(approximately $900) to Gokoku. See id. 
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At trial, the defense insisted that the offering of public money for 
a Shinto ceremony is not unconstitutional because the offering was 
made as an “administrative assistance” to the family members of the 
soldiers who died in war.72 As such, it was merely a social courtesy 
for the secular purpose of comforting the war dead and their family 
members.73 This argument was rejected by the court of first instance 
but prevailed at the High Court at Takamatsu.74
The Supreme Court reversed.75 It concluded that history, 
specifically the close alignment of the State and Shinto following the 
Meiji Restoration in 1868, had led to a great deal of harm and 
injustice, despite the ostensible guarantee of freedom of religion that 
existed at the time.76 Accordingly, the Court held that the new 
constitution was enacted to prevent government suppression of 
religion.77 The Court recognized that it was virtually impossible to 
completely separate religion from the state, especially where the state 
regulates the social—and thus sometimes the religious—lives of its 
citizens.78 The Court reasoned that “the principle of separation of 
state and religion, which is the basis of the constitutional provision 
and becomes the guiding principle for interpretation, demands the 
religious neutrality of the state but does not prohibit all connection 
with religion.”79 Therefore, the Court held, whether a particular 
government activity is constitutionally impermissible must be 
evaluated on the basis of the “purposes and effects of the given 
conduct[] . . . in light of the social and cultural circumstances of our 
country.”80 If, given appropriate social and cultural consideration, 
the challenged action has a religiously significant “‘purpose’ and has 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (“It is also said that the governor made the expenditure as a part of 
administration in order to support bereaved families and did not have any other intention, 
purpose, or deeply religious belief, and that the amount of offerings was really small and within 
the scope of social courtesy.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id; see also Michael Young, Japan and Religious Freedom: An American Perspective 
(1998), http://www.religiousfreedom.com/Conference/japan/Young.htm. 
 77. See Anzai, 51-4 MINSHŪ 1673.  
 78. Id. (“[T]he principle of separation of state and religion, which is the basis of the 
constitutional provision and becomes the guiding principle for interpretation, demands the 
religious neutrality of the state but does not prohibit all connection with religion.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
6KOBAYASHI.FIN 9/13/2005 3:44 PM 
683] Religion in the Public Sphere in Japan 
 701 
 
the ‘effect’ of assisting, promoting, oppressing, or intervening in 
religions,” it is constitutionally impermissible.81
Applying this test to the donations by the Governor of Ehime, 
the Court concluded that the ceremonies held by both the Yasukuni 
and Gokoku Shrines were religious in nature82 and that even if the 
governor did not have a religious purpose in offering the donations, 
known as tamagushiryo, the shrines used the donations to advance 
religious purposes.83 Therefore, “the average person [would be] 
impressed that the prefecture especially supports this specific 
religious group and that this religious group is special and different 
from other religious groups.”84 Concluding that “it is possible to 
mourn for the war dead and to console [their] bereaved families 
without such a special relationship with a specific religion,” the 
Japanese Supreme Court specifically rejected the social courtesy 
argument the defendants raised in the trial court.85 In summary, 
because the “purpose” of offering tamagushiryo could not avoid 
being classified as having religious significance, and because the 
“effect” of the tamagushiryo would be assistance and promotion by 
the state of a particular religion, albeit indirectly, the Court held that 
offering tamagushiryo was constitutionally impermissible.86
3. Response to this line of cases 
After Kakunaga, the constitution “should not be taken to 
prohibit all contact with religion, but rather [only] that which 
exceeds reasonable limits and which has as its purpose some religious 
meaning, or the effect of which is to promote, subsidize, or, 
conversely, to interfere with or oppose religion.”87 Based on this 
principle, some Japanese academics and judges have concluded that 
separation should be relative or limited. In the Anzai case, for 
example, despite the extension of the “purpose-effects test” to 
 81. Id. 
 82. As such, the Court concluded that these memorial services were distinguishable 
from the groundbreaking ceremony at issue in Kakunaga. Id.; see also Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, 
31-4 MINSHŪ 533 (Sup. Ct., July 13, 1977), reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 4, at 483. 
But see id. (Yoshida, J., dissenting), reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 4, at 483–85.  
 83. See Anzai v. Shiraishi, 51-4 MINSHŪ 1673 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 2, 1997).  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Kakunaga, 31-4 MINSHŪ at 533, reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 4, at 481. 
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expressly prohibit indirect promotions of religion, the majority of the 
Supreme Court at least ostensibly showed a renewed commitment to 
this view of limited separation.88
On the other hand, advocates of rigid separation, presupposing 
the secular nature of the state, assert that church and state should be 
completely separated.89 And yet, paradoxically, while these advocates 
insist on rigid separation in matters such as using public money to 
support a Shinto ceremony to purify a building site or to celebrate 
the completion of a monument to the loyal dead, they generally 
would permit a wide range of exceptions among other religious-
based activities of central and local governments and would allow 
government subsidization of even religious schools. 
I disagree with the Court’s conclusions in the Anzai case for the 
following reasons: 
1. A national or local governmental activity should be permissible 
when it is for a secular purpose, even if it has incidental religious 
significance. In this case, the provision of tamagushiryo should be 
within the range of secular purposes because it was conducted as a 
social courtesy. As such, it should not be considered religious activity 
by the local government even if the Shinto organization is acting in a 
religious manner.90
2. Heads of local governments attend countless ceremonies 
conducted according to Shinto, Buddhist, Christian, and other 
denominational traditions for festivals, marriages, funerals, and other 
such events. On those occasions, the fact that there is religious 
significance for those who conduct ceremonies (such as priests, 
ministers, and pastors) does not mean such significance exists for the 
government representatives participating. To them, participation and 
financial donations are usually merely social courtesies, and most 
observers, including most “average” Japanese observers, would 
agree. In the Anzai case, the defendant did not even attend the 
festival in question but simply had the donation delivered to the 
ceremony.91 Consequently, the action by the governor of Ehime had 
 88. See Anzai, 51-4 MINSHŪ 1673. 
 89. Consider, for example, the dissenting Justices in Kakunaga. 31-4 MINSHŪ at 533, 
reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 4, at 481. 
 90. This assertion may seem odd to my Western readers, who may be unfamiliar with 
the range of required social courtesies in Japan involving monetary gifts. However, many 
Japanese social conventions involve small monetary gifts, or o-rei. 
 91. See Anzai v. Shiraishi, 51-4 MINSHŪ 1673 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 2, 1997). 
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no religious meaning and should not have been adjudged 
constitutionally violative. 
3. In Kakunaga, the Supreme Court found that the Tsu City 
government was constitutionally justified in holding a ceremony 
purifying a building site, offering donations to ceremonies, and 
donating public money to Shinto ceremonies.92 Yet, it found similar 
activities by the Ehime Prefecture government to be 
unconstitutional.93 Unquestionably, there is a striking lack of balance 
and consistency in these decisions.94
4. The Anzai decision states that the Ehime Prefecture 
government donated public money to the Yasukuni Shrine only and 
not to any other religious organization.95 However, the prefecture 
had offered public money for the war dead ceremony held in the 
spring and autumn at Chidorigafuchi (Japan’s tomb of the unknown 
soldier), for construction of the war memorial in Okinawa, and for 
other similar events.96 If the Supreme Court asserts that the 
government is not permitted to donate public money to the 
Yasukuni Shrine, a religious organization, then this would essentially 
lead the government to practice religious discrimination. 
This assertion may strike some readers as odd without an 
understanding of the relationship between Yasukuni and 
Chidorigafuchi. The Yasukuni Shrine was established in 1879 by the 
Emperor Meiji to honor those who had died in war for the good of 
Japan.97 It therefore enshrines the souls of people who have fought 
for Japan in various conflicts.98 To the many Japanese who believe in 
Shinto,99 the souls enshrined at Yasukuni continue to protect the 
 92. See Kakunaga, 31-4 MINSHŪ 533, reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 4, at 
479–83. 
 93. See Anzai, 51-4 MINSHŪ 1673. 
 94. As pointed out in Justice Yoshida’s dissenting opinion in Kakunaga, “[i]t is 
clear . . . that this groundbreaking ceremony was a religious ceremony performed by a Shinto 
priest according to distinctly Shinto rituals. It is true that such ceremonies . . . have become 
secularized over time, but this groundbreaking was profoundly religious in atmosphere.” 
Kakunaga, 31-4 MINSHŪ 533 (Yoshida, J., dissenting), reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 
4, at 486. 
 95. See Anzai, 51-4 MINSHŪ 1673. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Yasukuni Jinja, About Yasukuni Jinja Q&A, http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/ 
qanda.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2005). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (discussing the number of Shinto 
followers in Japan). 
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country. The ceremonies at Yasukuni are also conducted to show the 
continued appreciation of the Japanese people for the sacrifices the 
war dead have made for Japan. Yasukuni therefore encompasses both 
religious and civic purposes. 
Chidorigafuchi is Japan’s tomb of the unknown soldier and is 
located in a serene park near the Imperial Palace.100 Like Yasukuni, 
the Chidorigafuchi cemetery was established to show the Japanese 
people’s appreciation for the sacrifices made by the war dead. Even 
though there is no shrine at Chidorigafuchi, it is nevertheless a 
spiritual place for many Japanese.101 The two sites thus serve similar 
purposes and evoke similar sentiments. 
I submit that allowing donations to the Chidorigafuchi cemetery 
but not to Yasukuni Shrine, simply because the former is secular and 
the latter religious, evinces hostility towards religion not justified 
after Kakunaga.102 Moreover, the tamagushiryo at issue in Anzai was 
a social courtesy that should have been adjudged constitutional on 
that basis alone. The Supreme Court’s contrary decision is 
unjustified after Kakunaga and inappropriate under the view that the 
 100. See JAPANESE MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL GARDENS AND 
NATIONAL CEMETERY, available at http://www.env.go.jp/en/rep/fcpn/parts/12.pdf (last 
visited May 21, 2005). 
 101. Similarly, Arlington National Cemetery in the United States is a spiritual place—it 
even has a nondenominational chapel available for funeral services. See ARLINGTON NATIONAL 
CEMETERY, CHAPEL SERVICES—SEA SERVICES, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.org/ 
ceremonies/clergy_information/Navy/chapel_services.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2005) 
(describing the protocol for visiting clergy). This chapel, while funded by the government, is 
nondenominational and provided as an accommodation for the families of soldiers being 
interred at Arlington. I would argue that accommodating the religious desires of families 
buried at Arlington is similar to the service performed at the Yasukuni Shrine because many 
Japanese desire to have their family members who died in the service of their country enshrined 
at Yasukuni. See Japan v. Nakaya, 42-5 MINSHŪ 277 (Sup. Ct., June 1, 1988) (Nagashima, J., 
concurring), reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 4, at 503 (noting that the enshrined 
serviceman’s father and siblings sent letters requesting his enshrinement). Significantly, while 
the Chidorigafuchi cemetery is operated by the Ministry on the Environment, Yasukuni Shrine 
is a private religious organization. If it is appropriate for the U.S. government to operate a 
chapel for use by the families of soldiers being interred at Arlington, it should also be 
appropriate for Japanese government officials to make donations to Yasukuni, which similarly 
uses the funds for the benefit of the families of the war dead. 
 102. While Article 89 of the Japanese Constitution provides that “[n]o public money . . . 
shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit, or maintenance of any religious 
institution or association,” in Kakunaga, the Japanese Supreme Court held that such 
expenditures are justified under the “purpose-effects test” if they have a secular purpose. 
Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, 31-4 MINSHŪ 533 (Sup. Ct., July 13, 1977), reprinted in BEER & 
ITOH, supra note 4, at 483. 
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purpose of separation of church and state is to promote individual 
religious liberty; in effect, the Anzai decision signals a paradigm shift 
towards viewing separation of church and state as an end in itself 
rather than the means to promoting religious liberty. 
To promote the view of separationism as a means for promoting 
religious liberty, the constitution should not forbid ostensibly 
religious conduct in the following situations: 
1. When a venerable religious tradition is simply recognized 
as a fact of social life; 
2. When the application of rigid separation is likely to lead to 
the suppression of a religion and denial of religious freedom; 
and 
3. When the easing of the separation between church and 
state does not assist a particular religion or oppress other 
religions. 
Under this view, the state would be permitted to utilize public 
money for religious events and practices as exemplified in 
Kakunaga.103 Similarly, it would be regarded as constitutionally 
acceptable to support prison chaplains, maintain a stone image of a 
“Jizo” (a guardian deity of children) on public property, purify a 
building site through a Shinto ceremony carried out by the local 
government, and other such religiously based activities. This position 
is appropriate because it is impossible to separate church and state to 
the absolutist degree proffered by the advocates of rigid separation. 
V. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
As discussed, following Anzai, the mainstream philosophy of 
church-state relations in postwar Japan has shifted away from limited 
separationism and is currently largely one of rigid separation of 
church and state. As an example of the effects of rigid separation, 
consider the state of religious education in public schools. 
At first glance, Article 20(3) of the Japanese Constitution gives 
the impression that it prohibits any kind of religious education in 
public schools.104 On August 15, 1946, the Diet passed a 
 103. See Momochi (1991), supra note 40, at 90. 
 104. KENPŌ [Constitution] art. 20(3) (Japan) (“The state and its organization shall 
refrain from religious education . . . .”). 
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“Resolution on the Education of Religious Sentiments,” which states 
with regard to Article 20, “We must stipulate in this section that a 
doctrine which is biased toward a particular religion or denomination 
must not be taught.”105 A provision in Article 9 of the Fundamental 
Law of Education stated this point of law more concretely: 
Now tolerance for religion and the place of religion in society must 
be respected in education. Therefore, certain religious education is 
not possible in public schools, but this does not apply to more 
general religious training. And in private schools, according to 
Article 24 of the School Law, it is possible to teach religion in place 
of ethics and the teacher’s license is issued specifically to allow for 
such a teaching. Therefore, institutionally the Japanese education 
laws value education on religion.106
In short, while the law provides that public schools must not 
advance a particular religion, it does not require the exclusion of 
religious education itself from public education. Rather, it specifically 
requires that “the attitude of religious tolerance and the position of 
religion in social life” must be respected.107
In spite of these provisions and the legitimate state interest in 
universal religious education in public schools, the reality is that 
religious education is substantially excluded from public schools even 
though education of religious sentiments is not legally prohibited. In 
the background of this silent policy is the “Shinto Directive,” which 
was issued by the occupation force on December 15, 1945, and 
which technically abolished governmental support for State Shinto. 
More broadly, the directive, by the insistence of the occupation 
force, resulted in the ultimate exclusion of all religious education 
from public schools.108 This situation continued even after the end of 
the occupation. 
 105. Resolution on the Education of Religious Sentiments. 
 106. Fundamental Law of Education, Art. 9, available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=12444&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC& 
URL_SECTION=201.html (quoted with analysis in Seishiro Sugihara, Separation of State and 
Religion and Japanese Education, Address at the International Coalition for Religious Freedom 
Conference on “Religious Freedom and the New Millennium” (May 23–25 1998), 
http://www.religiousfreedom.com/Conference/japan/Sugihara.htm)). 
 107. Id.  
 108. See KITAGAWA, supra note 15, at 271. Furthermore, the organization that played a 
leading part against religious education in public schools was the Japan Teachers Union 
(Nikkyoso), which believed in Marxism-Leninism and was largely antireligious. The 
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VI. RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN MODERN JAPAN 
The modern debate on the proper role of religion in the 
Japanese public sphere, in the context of history, is a relatively recent 
development. In fact, the term “religion” was only added to the 
Japanese lexicon about 135 years ago when it was translated as 
“Shukyo” from the German term “Religionsbewegung” (religious 
action).109 Prior to this, the term “Shukyo” did not exist. The new 
word was composed of two characters, “shu” and “kyo.” Shu means 
“memorial services for ancestors” or “main thought.” Kyo means “to 
teach” or “education.” Therefore, shukyo means the “teaching of 
ancestor” or “teaching of religious founder.”110
Consequently, whether Shintoism is a religion in the traditional 
Western sense is a point of some debate. Shinto has no religious 
founder and no moral teachings. Its historical significance is found in 
the fact that the Emperor was its chief minister.111 Shintoism 
originated in the ancient rice-farming culture and can be described as 
a religion seeking harmony with nature, adapting man to the change 
of seasons, and conveying a human way of life in its primitive 
simplicity.112 Thus, Shintoism is more of a cultural phenomenon and 
is at most a natural religion that existed before the Japanese state was 
established.113 It is deeply rooted in Japanese society in the form of 
social courtesies. For example, the social custom in Japan of 
removing one’s shoes before entering a home has its roots in Shinto 
teachings on purity; through time, this historic understanding has 
been subsumed into general social custom. Furthermore, because 
Shintoism was a natural religion that had no written doctrines, it 
could easily accept and coexist with Buddhism as a sectarian religion, 
thus tending to show that Shintoism itself is not a religion in the 
same sense that Buddhism is a religion. 
This raises the question whether “Shinto” is properly considered 
a religion at all. The interpretation of the new Japanese Constitution 
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science tended to cater to the Japan 
Teachers Union. 
 109. Takenori Aoayama, Shinkyou no Jiyu no Haikei [The Background on the Freedom of 
Religion in Japan] 1 (June 22, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
 110. Id. 
 111. See KITAGAWA, supra note 15; supra text accompanying note 15. 
 112. See KITAGAWA, supra note 15, at 1163–66. 
 113. See 4 RELIGIONS, supra note 16, at 1163. 
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has certainly made Shinto into a religion; however, because it has no 
founder and proscribes no moral conduct, it is very different from 
other religions like Buddhism or Christianity and is inconsistent with 
the meaning of religion as embodied in the Japanese term shukyo.114
The question of whether Shintoism is a “proper” religion is 
compounded by the fact that the Japanese Constitution, which is 
facially secular, makes the Emperor the symbol of the nation. As 
mentioned above, the Emperor is also the chief minister of Ise 
Shrine.115 Therefore, one might ask whether the Emperor’s ritual acts 
at Ise can be both Shinto and political, or whether the act of the 
Emperor in his political capacity should be legally differentiated from 
his ritual act. Presuming Shinto to be a religion separate from the 
state, we must differentiate the Emperor’s political actions from his 
ritual ones. Therefore, it follows that his ritual act is simply his 
private religious act or a manifestation of his personal beliefs. 
However, this differentiation is unsupported by history and is a 
casual and somewhat naïve hypothesis only. 
Insofar as the Japanese Constitution embraces the Emperor as a 
symbol—which it continues to do—the Emperor has performed 
rituals both as the chief minister of the Shinto religion and as the 
symbol of the state. This dual role should be regarded as being 
embraced in the constitution. Putting aside questions of the 
Emperor’s multiple roles, it should be clear that any constitutional 
system that embraces an emperor as both a political and religious 
figure cannot perfectly separate religion and state. Thus, the most 
proper definition of “Shinto,” taking into account the historical and 
present realities of the Emperor’s important role in Shinto, is that it 
is more a traditional social convention than a religion. 
This definition would have enormous practical implications for 
the Yasukuni Shrine problem. As discussed above, the war dead from 
the Meiji Restoration forward are all memorialized in the Yasukuni 
Shrine.116 The Japanese State had promised that the war dead would 
be enshrined therein and prayed for by the Emperor and prime 
minister. They did so until the 1970s, when the so-called “A-Class” 
war criminals were enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine. Subsequently, 
Japanese left-oriented newspapers and the Chinese and Korean 
 114. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
 115. See supra text accompanying note 15.
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 99–100.
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governments began to criticize these official visits by public figures. 
Succumbing to this pressure, the Emperor stopped visiting the 
shrine. That the Prime Minister continues to do so provokes 
criticism every year.117 However, the State is obliged to maintain its 
promise to the war dead. Even separating the religious elements, 
which probably underlay the promise originally, commemorating the 
sacrifices made by soldiers in defense of country and expressing the 
nation’s continued appreciation for their efforts is a valid secular 
purpose.118
Defining Shinto as a traditional social convention provides the 
ultimate solution to this problem because then the visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine is an act of social courtesy rather than an act of religious 
significance. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In a pluralistic society in which various religions coexist, it is 
essential for the maintenance of peace that the state exercise religious 
neutrality. That does not mean the state should be antireligious or 
even nonreligious. For the sake of social stability, a state should 
recognize the importance of religion in the lives of its citizens, value 
the contributions of religious groups, and respond to religions 
favorably. 
Freedom of religion is guaranteed most effectively in a society 
where the state and religious organizations remain separate, 
recognize mutual independence, and cooperate in the areas where 
they have common interests. Among democratic states governed by 
the rule of law, each country must maintain religious freedom in the 
context of its unique historical background. Hence, no country 
possesses the ideal method of protecting religious freedom that can 
be applied universally in other countries. 
Still, an enduring constitution protects freedom of religion. The 
separation of church and state is an important tool in ensuring that 
this protection is vibrant and meaningful. Constitutions, however, 
 117. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, The Japan-China Stew: Sweet and Sour, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
16, 2005, at A4. 
 118. By way of comparison, the annual visit by the President of the United States to 
Arlington National Cemetery on Memorial Day should not be prohibited because there may 
be religious implications to the visit. Rather, the annual visit is an appropriate method of 
showing appreciation for the sacrifices made by the soldiers. See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, At 
Arlington, Bush Salutes the Dead of Wars Past and Present, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2004, at A3. 
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also necessarily reflect the cultural and social mores of the people 
that enact them, often shaped and influenced by history and religion. 
For example, Western Europe and North America have largely built 
their constitutional systems on the basis of Christian culture. This 
not only reflects the historical religious preferences of their founders 
but also acknowledges that many of the countries’ citizens today 
believe in certain principles that are founded on religious precepts. 
That it is appropriate—perhaps even essential—for a constitutional 
structure to reflect the public policy of a state when that policy is 
informed by religious precepts indicates that separation of church 
and state need not require hostility towards religion. 
Moreover, even Western Europe and North America, which 
generally are regarded as successful in ensuring religious freedom, 
have their unique problems.119 Yet despite these problems, these 
areas of the world still strive to maintain religious freedom and 
protect religious minorities. That they are able to do so in their 
Christian-influenced legal systems suggests that it is both possible 
and permissible for Japan to build its constitutional system on the 
basis of Shinto and Buddhist culture, in spite of any historical 
burdens associated with those religions, and still be able to maintain 
religious freedom and protect religious minorities. 
We must remember that the goal is protecting religious freedom, 
and the separation of church and state is merely one means to 
accomplishing that goal. 
 
 119. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 1 (detailing church-state issues currently confronting 
both the United States and France). 
